New united Black Consciousness political body to launch soon

The united or unified Black Consciousness Movement is set to launch soon, possibly in next month.

The core of the story is not new; it has been a long and winding road towards unity for Azapo, the Socialist Party of Azania (Sopa) and the Black People’s Convention (BPC). The intent was expressed as far back as 2000, and there have been previous announcements indicating that progress has been made.

But now, and with Ishmael Mkhabela facilitating, the process has apparently moved past the point of no return. And with the launch, the main leaders – like PAC leaders when it launched in 1959 – will feel the pressure to perform and deliver.

The launch is a major achievement given the many differences that lay like potholes and snares along the path. Past hurts, angry divisions, the bitterness of jilted partnerships, prima donna-ism, clashes over what needs to be done – these were all there.

The parties are in some ways splinters off the same block; and apart from needing to sort out a common vision and a shared strategic view of SA, had to overcome (or at least manage) significant personality tensions during the talks.

I will be watching the launch with a hawk’s eye. I am less interested in who the leaders will be, the name of the new animal (both contentious issues during the talks, I am told) and where funding will come from. I am far more interested in what niches the new body will seek to occupy and what programmes are to be implemented.

Leaders involved in the talks have pointed to tensions and divisions in the ANC and the ANC’s tripartite alliance, and emphasize that now is a good time to form a strong, credible left-of-centre opposition. They even point to events unfolding in Zimbabwe – and have declared that a new force such as BCM would be ready to harvest the tons of disillusioned voters that the ANC would be shedding when a similar fracturing of the ruling party happens here. Regarding the next elections, some BC voices say: “Many former ANC supporters will be looking for a party to vote for in the next elections, and we’ll be there,” while others say, “I fear the unification has come too late to make an impact on the next election.”

However – as a strategy – capitalizing on the weakness of another party is insufficient. You also have to be clear about what you are “for”.

Thus, as the launch date approaches, one might ask:
- Will the main focus for the new entity be formal politics and fighting elections? (Indications are that the new formation will definitely take part in the next elections).
Will it, alternately, place more emphasis on an identity as a cultural-political movement, working primarily in the realm of ideas, education, consciousness, etc?
- Will the new player adopt a primary focus area and if so, what choice will be made between focus areas such as service delivery to the poor; justice and human rights issues and the challenge of ensuring access to justice for all, and; effective government institutions (and accountability in these terms)?
- Will it take part in government, if given the opportunity to do so, and as a key black consciousness figure, Mosibudi Mangena, a minister in Mbeki’s Cabinet is doing?.
Will it regularly take part in or initiate social mobilization, or will it eschew mass action in favour of using national parliament as a platform?
- Will leaders continue to throw around terms such as 'Scientific Socialism' as a key reference, as some did in early stages of the talks? And if so, how will they translate such a term so that it has practical relevance in the light of the day-to-day struggles of the marginalised? Does adherence to such an ideology mean, for example, that BCM will prioritise alliances with trade unions and privilege labour issues?
- What does black consciousness mean (BC) today? [In its hey day, BC played a key role (See my blog entitled Finding the ‘fit’ between Biko’s ideas and the Tambo path to freedom, 19/09/07). Together with worker and trade union action, it ignited resistance in highly repressive times when the struggle was at its lowest ebb. What will be its key message today? Now almost everyone can be ‘black conscious’; anyone can make a fist – even companies (that want to reach the mass market), mainstream radio stations, clothing brands, advertisers, fly-by-night colleges, funeral parlours, and so on].

The various parts of the BC movement are already scarred by their past encounters with such questions. Misreading the mood of the people, Azapo boycotted the first election - and arguably lost ground among the electorate. By the time they joined the electoral system, they could only muster enough support to win one seat in parliament.

Around 1994, Azapo was the main flag bearer for black consciousness. Then Lybon Mabaso, citing differences, broke away to form the Sopa in 1996. The party split further when some opposed (and Mosibudi Mangena accepted) an offer to participate in Mbeki’s government after the 1999 elections. Those unhappy with Mangena’s strategic stance formed BPC.

All the protagonists have since kissed and made up; but the new leaders will have to do more than hug each other and smile for the cameras on launch day and after. They will need to speak with one voice on strategic issues, display respect for a collective and shared leadership, and consistently demonstrate healthy ways of debating and reaching agreement when major differences arise.

As always, I ask: What do readers think? Will the new body make a major difference to the political scene in Mzansi? Please add your comment.

Government stirs the pot at launch of report on democracy at local government level

Things are not good at local government level. That is, when measured against the requirements of good governance, according to a recently released report.

A network of NGOs, the Good Governance Learning Network (GGLN), launched its report yesterday in Johannesburg. The report follows eighteen months of research and is entitled ‘Local Democracy in Action: A civil society perspective of local governance in action’.

Based on the interplay of inputs from the presenter’s table, the launch was odd. This was so in the main because government caused a stir when it assumed the moral high ground and slammed the report for not being critical and provocative enough.

The presenter of the report, Terence Smith (who is also co-ordinator of the GGLN), made a number of key points arising from a substantial report that referred several times to the existence of a “crisis” at local government level.

Discussing democracy and participation, Smith noted that in many cases, participation (the obligation for community participation in local governance) was observed in the breach. The ward committee system – a key structure for citizen participation – was weak with these bodies lacking focus and meaningful decisionmaking power. Ward committees allow municipalities to meet formal obligations but “crowd out” more effective forms of participation, he noted. The Integrated Development Plans, although somewhat improved and lately “more credible”, remained a problematic area. According to Smith, the report asked whether IDPs had become too complex, and were a barrier to rather than an appropriate tool for community participation.

He referred to implementation of municipalities' indigent policy, observing that far too many deserving people are insufficiently aware of the benefits due to them. He stated further that local governments were generally doing poorly on local economic development, and that gains seemed to be generally confined to tourism-related initiatives.

Speaking as respondent, Idasa’s Steven Friedman, noted that reviews could either take a consultancy approach (“tweaking existing policies or approaches”) or a critical stance. He charged that the CGLN report was a good example of the consultancy orientation; it merely provided “helpful hints on how to tweak things”. However, he argued, the consultancy approach was ill-advised in a context where the existing policies were the cause of the governance problems and the crisis of confidence at local level. Friedman argued that NGOs should be far more critical and ought to be making full use of the relatively greater open political ‘space’ in South Africa today. Friedman criticised various aspects in the report: indigent policies (coupled with targeting and the means test) were demeaning and further marginalised the poorest; capacity building was not the answer to municipalities' skills problems - local goverment should simply do less; more effective citizen partipation will lead to better technical solutions.

Then government, through the Department of Provincial and Local Government Director-General, Ms Lindiwe Msengana-Ndlela, raised eyebrows when it questioned various aspects of the report. The director-general:
- observed that critical thought, coupled with alternative proposals, was necessary in debates about policy and practice.
- complained that the report did not highlight “best practice”.
- bemoaned that this report did not state “what should be discontinued”.
- said the report erred in devoting a major section to ‘service delivery’; this was a term government used -- NGOs should rather be talking more holistically about “development”.
- said she detected aspects of unfavourable agendas e.g. neo-liberalism and certain ideas from the past, and this caused her to scrawl “No, no” in pages in her copy of the report.
- lamented that the report was weighted in favour of “known issues”; she wanted a report that provide more new information.

There was limited discussion following the speakers’ presentation; it was, after all, a launch. But, over drinks, delegates mulled over the more provocative or, in the speakers’ own words, “impolite” comments that were left hanging in the air.

The government’s line at the launch was interesting. As one delegate to the launch noted: “It was if the government was saying: ‘These problems have nothing to do with us. Unless you can bring us a different report, a better or more critical report, we cannot even begin to consider or discuss what you think ought to be done by those in power’. In those terms, it was the neatest of tricks.

The launch featured a most unusual input by a government spokespersons at a function of partners and – even in the truncated discussion from the floor that followed – a remarkable avoidance of the pertinent issues at stake. Participants were left none the wiser about what is to be done about the report's stark judgement: that aside from local government elections, there is little by way of effective accountability, community participation and active citizen involvement in local governance taking place.

The launch was held at the Centre for Policy Studies. Participants in the network include CPS and various NGOs active in the field of local government issues.

The network’s criteria for good governance are:
- Democracy
- Responsibility
- Accountability
- Equitable service delivery and poverty reduction.

The GGLN receives backing from Mott Foundation, Ford Foundation and GTZ.

Great opportunity for intellectuals to play a bolder role

It is a time of change and renewal – or, at the very least, a time of upheaval - in the continent and the country.

These are times when intellectuals – however defined – need to take stock of the role they will play. Their role in change processes is not an exclusive role – there are other forces at play, including class forces, popular forces, economic factors and shifts in global power relations. But given their role in mobilising new ideas – organizing interests, mobilizing consensus and, as Edward Said put it, changing minds and expanding markets – their potentially have a substantial part to play in moving things in positive and hopeful directions.

Intellectuals are active on many fronts, and operate extensively beyond the ‘traditional’ spheres of intellectual activity. They are used and deployed by all kinds of interests – in roles as consultants, journalists, professionals, policy advisors, marketers, makers of cultural products, and so on – and it is high time they reviewed what it means to be an intellectual and what responsibility necessarily accompanies this function.

From the progressive viewpoint, intellectuals should side with what is right, should be part of making a better world and should strive, as Said has noted, to combat prejudice, to advance justice and to be free of double standards as regards their attitudes to treatment of human beings.

Various voices have commented on the role of intellectuals in South Africa during its complicated transition process. President Thabo Mbeki has lamented that intellectuals are not playing their role and wept, so to speak, for black intellectuals. Xolela Mangcu hit back, arguing that the ruling party muzzled intellectuals, and has used its powers to restrict intellectual activity. Mangcu rails against (to lift from a chapter title in his recent book) "Mbeki's assault on black intellectuals". The dispute aside, there is agreement that, going forward, the country needs more vibrant debate, more open discussion of options and alternatives and more evidence-based engagement around burning issues.

There is now much more open space for discussion and debate in South Africa. This is so for various reasons. There has been a dramatic change in leadership at the ANC’s Polokwane conference last December – and it seems that since then, we regularly witness divergent positions emanating from within the ruling party on key policy matters. Leading up to Polokwane, a surge of grassroots pressure has thrown wide open the debate about the pace and the methods of social change.

Furthermore, the winds of change battering Zimbabwe seems to be good for the democratic climate in other regional countries. We in South Africa must face up to the possibility of a second transformation in recently-liberated countries; and we must discuss under what conditions that may occur (or should occur), and what the political goals of such a change should be. Also in the present period, various societal issues – resurgence of racism, service delivery crises – are coming to the boil and a range of governance issues demand attention – the role of parastatals; the relationship between parliament(s) and the executive.

It is a good time for intellectuals. They can be in the fray as South Africa’s precious democracy – so robust in many ways and yet so fragile in parts – gets reengineered.

They can play a much more prominent role. They can be much more vocal, they can, to a greater extent, stand up for generally recognized human rights, eschew narrow interests, transgress when blind compliance is required; they can debate and ask questions, speak with/for the marginalized and – most of all – encourage democratic debate.

Intellectuals can play a dynamic role in fanning the democratic participation that seems to be a prerequisite for the economically vibrant, well-functioning, just and winning society we are building.

For intellectuals, the moment is ripe to be in the forefront of generating ideas and options to sustain/improve our democracy and to vastly improve service-delivery to the poorest. To contribute to getting better policies, to ensuring better policy implementation, to strengthening accountability systems and to expansion of effective leadership in government departments.

Speaking as a progressive (and admitting my bias), intellectuals have the opportunity – more than ever – to be clear about supporting our democratic transformation as it strives to eradicate the pain and division of the past and build a prosperous and just future for all.

Leadership lessons: finding meaning in the regional crises

There are major leadership issues in Southern Africa. This is exemplified in events in Zimbabwe, at Eskom and the recent positions taken by SADC on the Zimbabwean crisis. All these flashpoints illustrate that when leaders and leadership fail, the public gets the short end of the stick (and endure additional and unnecessary pressure, burdens and suffering).

In Zimbabwe, the main political leaders have taken advantage of the population for many years; at the same time, these leaders in the ruling party have managed to get vast numbers of Zimbabweans to continue to vote for them in successive elections. At present, the ruling party, Zanu-PF, with its controlling tentacles in all state institutions, has stifled release of election results and has for many weeks blocked the ascension of a new government into power. In the April elections, Zimbabweans have at last exercised their vote to remove Zanu-PF from office; however, ordinary Zimbabweans, by and large, still shy away from using non-violent means to restore proper functioning of democratic institutions and an to end to repression.

At Eskom, with electricity blackouts arising from a lack of planning and poor strategic management, the leadership has failed to assume responsibility in any substantial sense. The Eskom debacle raises the following: Are institutions accountable to anyone; do they subscribe to any sense of minimum performance requirements for such a strategic entity; do they subscribe to a formerly adopted notion of leadership? If they were and did, how can the organization simply concede failure without any actions – a suspension, a firing, a withholding of bonuses or (at the most limpwristed) a pro forma rebuke of a person or committee – to indicate that the parastatal subscribes to high leadership standards.

The SADC fails to take bold leadership action when a more courageous position is required in the interests of regional justice and regional stability. It would appear a kind of “club” loyalty, and sometimes a historical solidarity between heads of state, takes precedence. Certainly, we can see that regional leaders and heads of state would want to be polite and “chommie-chommie” with each other, but should they protect each other at all costs? Should they avoid speaking up during a regional crisis or in the face of a member state’s systematic viciousness against its citizens? The people of the region have expectations of SADC. These expectations will never be fulfilled if the SADC does not see itself as a body that must provide bold leadership, if it does not set membership ground rules and if the collective does not require that members be in good standing in terms of such rules.

When leaders go off the rails, especially national leaders, it is often not just leaders that are failing; in many cases it is in fact a failure of the entire leadership system.

In situations of such failure - depending on how followers react - a big question mark often hangs over followers. A good leadership culture requires followers that are active, on their toes and alert about what they are entitled to. Whether we like it or not, we as followers get the quality of leadership we deserve/ are prepared to work for/ are prepared to struggle for. We get the leadership systems that we are prepared to build and sustain. A failure of leadership may also suggest that an erosion of leadership and of leadership culture in political parties and other influential organizations. In such formations, systems of accountability and succession planning may not be functioning properly and are most likely not working to replace moribund leaders who are out of touch with the current context.

Finally, the collapse of leadership culture may mean that formal institutions are failing; institutions set norms and boundaries for what leaders may or may not do. When leadership problems take the form of excesses – attacks on human rights, corruption, misuse of powers, failure to fulfill a legal duty to act – institutions measures should kick in and ensure corrective action is taken. However, if perverse and destructive leadership hangs around for years or decades, their hands firmly on the reins of power, then key institutions urgently need rebuilding or rejuvenation.

Leadership as discussed here includes but is broader than the skills, behaviors and performance of individual leaders. Leadership should be seen as:
a system;
a set of relationships; or
a culture (in the sense of agreed norms and practices).

In this regard, leadership can be seen as the expectations we have, the consequences which follow poor leadership and the demand for good leadership.

It is necessary to refer to expectations as they refer to the standards that prevail in the community or in companies regarding leadership. However, “expectations” are still relatively passive - necessary but insufficient. Just having them says nothing about what happens when leadership expectations are disappointed. If “consequences” (e.g. that you be stripped of your leadership position in certain circumstances) as well as the “demand” for good quality leadership are part of the process, it would speak of a more vibrant leadership culture.

From this, one can see how important followership is. What are the things that make up good followership? I suggest these aspects are important: A sense that you are entitled to good leadership, being alert and critical, voting in an intelligent manner, calling on leaders to provide information and reportback, mutual accountability between leaders and followers, and openly expressing views on issues so leaders know what followers feel and think.

I hope these reflections contribute in a small way to an agenda for change in Southern Africa. To a process that moves us beyond crises and towards fulfilling the potential of the region. If we can draw out critical lessons about governance in the region, then maybe – just maybe – there will be some meaning in the crises we are experiencing.

As usual, readers comments and replies are welcomed!

Let's keep tackling racism - taking the medicine is necessary

On racism, South Africa is a bit like the TB patient who, because the medicine has started to kick in, presumes he is cured, celebrates early and stops taking his medicine. Just because so many things were better, many of us somehow imagined that centuries of racism was no longer a problem in Mzansi (South Africa).

But in recent times – at long last – there has been a ringing wake up call. The UFS incident – the racist and sadistic form of the loutish student behavior at that university – has shocked the nation. And it has revealed how racism, like the eggs and infant offspring of Godzille, is alive and seething below the urbane surface of South Africa. This weekend, apart from additional racist attacks (such as the skinhead-type attack on a DA leader and his wife), Afrikaner writers confirm the existence and vibrancy of racism (see below).

There seemed to be little appetite to discuss race and racial issues in the last 10 to 13 years. Those who tried to foreground the issue often walked a gauntlet of abuse – including accusations that they themselves were being racist.

Thus, in the post 1994 period:
a)The Democratic Alliance equated any discussion of racism and racist attitudes with the playing of “the race card”. Their stance was matched by responses from certain volk artists and some Afrikaner rightwing parties who believed the real issue was the marginalization of Afrikaners and their language in the new SA. How pathetic can (some) former oppressors be? As Max du Preez says: “Meneer en mevrou, haal ten minste die witbrood (of sale ek eerder se die BMW en vakansiehuis) onder jou arm uit voordat jy jou lot so bitterlik bekla …” Despite crime which affects us all, he tells Afrikaners in effect to “get a life”: “(D)ie verlies aan mag is die onafwendbare gevolg van die einde van wit oorheersing” (Beeld, 12/04/08).

b) There was skepticism, irate reaction and lack of appreciation when President Thabo Mbeki raised the issue of race in Parliament in 2004 and at other times. It is interesting to note that – since the UFS debacle – the President has maintained silence on the matter. Maybe he believes that he has done his bit; in earlier times, his efforts were rewarded with media accusations that he was unceremoniously dumping Nelson Mandela's reconciliation vision. The rest of the public, including the general black community, remained silent. A senior figure in the HRC commented to me then that, since it was the country's President raising the issue, people probably felt too intimidated to pick up the discussion and openly express themselves on the issue. He noted that it would be better if discussion on racism was initiated from another quarter.

c) The Human Rights Commission has recoiled from substantial, sustained and proactive work around race and anti-racism in the last decade or more. For South Africa, having a Constitution that is non-racist and non-racial is a great achievement. However, institutional mechanisms (programmes, budgets and responsible people) are needed to convert what the Constitution envisages into reality. These “operational” elements are important in a situation where state-supported racial oppression has ruled the roost for centuries. The Human Rights Commission and the Justice Department should be carrying out the developmental and change management work necessary for building non-racialism. Words like education, awareness and “good practice” guidelines come to mind; so do words such as research and dialogue.

d) Indications are that many top black people, the high achievers, themselves wanted to be shot of talk of race and racism. They wanted to shut it out. It was a bad experience that they wished to put behind them. They would rather talk of poverty and disadvantaged people than racism or racial discrimination. They feel uncomfortable when race issues are mentioned and, as it were, they have to take a position which might be controversial. They would rather focus on making money than getting into controversial discussions with other people – colleagues or superiors on the other side of the fence – who have so much real and residual power. For these high flyers, discussing race sidetracks from their achievements, from their individual abilities and from their desire to be accepted as top performing and value adding individuals in the capitalist world.

e) For the media generally, discussion of racism was not sexy. Each story of racially based abuse (for example, violent attacks on defenceless farmworkers by white bosses) was treated as an isolated incident. Probing the family and community attitudes that informed or condoned such attacks was apparently uninteresting or un-newsworthy. Much of the media went further: any discussion of race was condemned as a ploy. In terms of that stance, much too simplistically, anyone wanting to stimulate discussion of racism was really attempting to avoid investigation of corruption or plotting to muzzle the free press.

f) Most foreign donors wanted to savour the SA miracle. They did not want discussion of continued racial oppression to disturb this (rare) taste of nirvana. Working for decades, investing millions in programmes that show limited success in life's bigger scheme, they wanted and needed a success story. For them, the time had come to focus on development issues (as distinct from political issues [such as race] that would need explaining to Foreign Affairs back home). Focusing on continued racist practice on farms, on the experience of black children at university, on the racial implications of the school system in South Africa, just did not fit with the dominant picture. And so, funding for NGOs dealing with racism and promoting diversity and pluralism dried up. And so such NGOs declined or went to the wall.

g) A whole rainbow industry emerged. This included the advertising industry, do-gooders and well-meaners and the highly paid image makers/branders in our society. In this context, there would be no social responsibility funds – either from parastatals and corporations - to address racist attitudes and practices. In other words, it was expected that racial ideology would somehow simply fade away, all on its own, without assistance from any quarter. What the marketers and newsouthafrica spin-doctors do not realize is this: we can hug the vision of the rainbow nation and at the same time continue to be alert to how racism might continue to live below the surface (in our homes and in institutions), influencing our behaviour and attitudes.

Just to conform that racism is not just a figment of in the minds of some spoilsports or confined to the University of Free State incident, this past weekend
• The Sunday Times carried a story about young white Afrikaners using the World Wide Web (Facebook) to propagate racist views and their opposition to democratic SA. So strident is language (bordering on hate speech) and racist rhetoric on the forums concerned that other Afrikaners are lobbying to have them shut down.
• The Sunday Times editor, Mondli Makhanya, alleged that a former columnist – one hailed as a blue eyed boy by tens of thousands of white readers – maintained the controversial view “essentially that black people are indolent savages”.
• In Beeld, Johann Rossouw, in an article trying to understand root causes, confirms the increasing racism among young Afrikaners (“die toenemende rassisme wat .. vandag onder [jonger] Afrikaners voorkom”.)
• In the same edition of Beeld, Max du Preez (who anticipated he would get tons of abusive mail from fellow-Afrikaners for his views) notes that “black South Africans are all too aware of the extent to which white people regard them as inferior”.
(Of course, the latter views show that there are no solid monolithic blocs for and against racism and, although racism is widespread, there is enormous potential for South Africans from different background to unite against the scourge).

In all of this, the upside is that more of us are rubbing the sleep from our eyes and seeing again the reality of racism plus the need for concrete programmes and initiatives to combat racism.

A website that blows the cobwebs off research papers

The webside www.dissertation.com is such a good idea: it takes research work produced as part of studies (usually subsidised by public sector funds) and makes it more widely available.

Okay, access is not completely gratis: after accessing a certain number of free pages, you are encouraged to buy the full text. But it does make visible/available knowledge and analysis that would otherwise gather dust on the shelves or in the archives of universities.

I have consequently placed the research piece from my Masters degree on this site. Although a little dated now, it deals with issues of poverty in the urban area, survival strategies of the poor and prospects for vibrant city economies in Africa. It is entitled: Informalisation as a Strength. Community Survival Systems and Economic Development in the African City.

Check it out. Location:
www.dissertation.com/book.php?method=ISBN&book=1599426641

Or you might simply want to visit www.dissertation.com to see what other thinking work is available there.

Let's err on the side of giving FBJ the space to mobilise

I usually agree with Jody Kollapen, chairperson of the Human Rights Commission; he usually has a particularly good take on the SA set up. And his articulation of issues often promotes deeper understanding of the aspects involved.

But I differ with his finding on whether the Forum of Black Journalists has a right to organize on the basis of black solidarity.

Kollapen was today reporting back on an investigation into this matter following a complaint by white journalists at Radio 702 regarding a “blacks only” FBJ launch event held recently. Kollapen reported that the HRC saw no problem with limiting attendance at an event to members only. It took issue, more fundamentally, with the (blacks only) membership policy of the FBJ. Such a policy position was unconstitutional, Kollapen argued.

The HRC findings are technically correct and well argued. The findings are also strongly consistent with the “ideal” – and with the desired end state of positive social engagement and interaction in South Africa.

But the findings overlook the following:
• The fact that SA is in transition and that, in key areas, that transition is painfully slow, as Kollapen himself argued recently.
• The historical context, including the fact that in the past there was general acceptance and respect for the decision of certain liberation organizations to use racial exclusion in their membership policies.
• That the Constitution emphases socio-economic rights and dignity as much as it does non-racialism; are we also prepared to declare policies that promote inequality, such as privatization of the provision of basic services, “unconstitutional”?
• That black and white people rarely come together in common forums to forge common objectives, often seem ignorant of the fact they are working towards the same objectives; rarely engage each other in open debate to debunk/challenge assumptions, stereotypes and preconceptions.
• That, in this context, many may feel that the best way to focus energies advance objectives is to unite those who are affected in the same way about an issue.
• The implications of the finding for women’s organizations; there are many instances where – even though the HRC may interpret the country’s Constitution in the same way for them – women may feel they can marshal their energies better if they do not have to deal with the dynamics unleashed by the participation of men.

The findings are thus hard-edged (at a time when we are just starting to open the space for debate on “race”) and bordering on the coercive (in a situation where strong pointers, recommendations and a developmental finding might work better). We cannot get non-racial practice by decree – not when social cohesion and inter-group interaction remains severely limited (and certainly not while there is such a paucity of interventions to promote anti-racism, discussion of race in society and social cohesion).

I believe that - especially if the ultimate aims are outcomes like non-racialism and justice - people should as far as possible/reasonable, be permitted to organize in ways that are relevant for them.

I can see what the HRC wants to do: it wants to drive the society towards non-racialism. I can see the implications for its ruling for political and non-political organisations, clubs that would want to exclude people simply on the basis of race. But, with an eye to the historical development of political organisations of the disadvantaged and given the imperatives of free expression and association, I believe there should be a sunset provision. I believe that organisations - including particularly those bodies whose target group is people who have been specifically affected by oppressive racial legislation - should be given a period of, say, a year to 18 months to make the required changes to membership policy. Such a period of transition should run from case by case complaints or - provided the HRC rolls out a general public engagement and information-dissemination process beforehand - a general HRC ruling or pronouncement.

That is my contradictory position: I say Jody has got it wrong; at the same time, I laud him as a leader and a key thinker on issues of justice.

Do you agree with my views as expressed here? Please feel free to post your reply.