Zuma makes headway as succession battle boils over

The ANC succession battle is reaching its peak.

All the indications are that Jacob Zuma is set to become ANC president. That assertion is important with implications that reverberate widely. A powerful lobby has built up in the ANC against the current top leadership and - according to Mac Maharaj - against the dominant style and politics in the party. Indeed the sentiments and attitudes concerned have become a mighty force. Zuma benefits from the changing mood - but he has also demonstrated political skill in welding various interests groups in the movement into a coherent grouping.

The mobilisation for a new leadership arrangement, one that distinguishes itself from the dominant and closely knit group around President Thabo Mbeki, has taken place over a long period of time. It reached a high water mark at the ANC's National General Council last year when official plans to suspend Zuma as an ANC Deputy President were scuttled by the broader ANC leadership.

The following key points need to be made:

- Initially the flurry of support for Jacob Zuma could be characterised as mainly a reaction to Mbeki and his core team. This has now changed; the initial groundswell has been built into a substantive political platform with a defined agenda and with intensive support for Jacob Zuma as a leader per se. The support for Zuma has thus been transformed from from shallow to deep.

- Many in the Mbeki camp are now taking Jacob Zuma and his chances to ascend to power very seriously. This means that we are likely to see additional erosion of support from Mbeki to Zuma. Indeed the recent voting at provincial level shows how the Zuma camp is benefiting from the gradual shifts that are currently taking place. In the days to come, undecided voters and some Mbeki supporters are more likely to "jump ship" into the Zuma camp. Needless to say, it seems that many emergent ANC leaders would rather be in the winning group than be in the wilderness and lose out on government positions when the Zuma camp ascends to political power. In this regard, large dollops of personal interests must be factored into the moves and positioning of leaders at branch level and upwards.

- Personal interest and ambition must also be taken into account when trying to understand why the ANC Women's League, in its nomination vote, dumped Mbeki as candidate in favour of Jacob Zuma. In making its decision, the League left many in the Mbeki camp "shocked". Its nomination decision also caused consternation among feminist and women's organisations, many of which have been highly critical of Jacob Zuma especially after certain comments that Zuma made during the rape trial (in which he was acquitted).

- There is likely to be feverish and intensive lobbying on the day before the actual voting at the ANC's December elective conference. Indications are that offers - positions, rewards and incentives - will form part of the maneuvering, discussion and horse-trading. So one should always remain open to some surprises and changes in the precise strength of support for either Zuma or Mbeki. However, all the signs are that such shifts will be "too little, too late" to change the main patterns of support that obtain presently.

- The Zuma camp is clearly brimming with confidence. It has already begun addressing how it will structure itself and what it will be required to rule the country. Its organising teams have been extending their campaign work to include the task of sourcing support, resources and expertise that would be required to constitute an effective Zuma presidency.

- The policy directions being punted by the Zuma camp include greater government interaction with civil society, a more meaningful role for the tripartite alliance, a clearer emphasis on a developmental state (an emphasis in recent years shared by the Mbeki group) and greater transparency regarding the use of state agencies to clamp down on ANC leaders.

In addition to all of the above, there are also rumours that a group of Cabinet Ministers (who are generally viewed as part of the Mbeki camp) have approached Zuma to clear the air and to present themselves as neutral. "What have we done to make you view us your enemy?" the group asked Zuma as they pleaded for him to accept that they are not opposed to him. These leaders clearly want Zuma to note their willingness (eagerness?) to assist him and work with him should he come to power. By extension, they are declaring their openness to being wooed by the Zuma camp ahead of the crucial December leadership vote.

The Zuma camp must now work feverishly to repackage Zuma to make him more acceptable to sceptical audiences outside the ANC and internationally. Their challenge is to change the primary associations that spring to mind when the wider public think of Zuma -- to change the dominant mental picture from Zuma the person involved in corruption and the man with question marks about his views of women to Zuma to the leader with important strengths to lead the country into its next phase of development. Not an easy task by any means. Zuma has consequently launched a major charm offensive. He is devoting a great deal of time to engage key interest groups locally and has, for example, travelled abroad in the last week as part of a process of "selling" his leadership and vision further afield.

Given the array of forces within the ANC supporting Jacob Zuma to assume the role of president of the ANC, the Zuma train won't be derailed before December and is well on its way to its destination.

As always, please share your your views by adding your comment.

June 16 is a key part in the building of democracy

June 16 is 31 years old this week. As usual, this day evokes strong feelings for millions of people.

The day – and the earth-shaking happenings associated with it – continues to stand out in significance, even after all these years.

June 16 1976 was, firstly, a turning point for the government of the day.

For the regime, it came as a bolt from the blue. Beyond the knee jerk, South Africa's rulers had no idea how to respond. And when they used guns against kids, they again demonstrated their inability to relate properly to a nation of wondrously diverse people as well as to govern a complex country with justice. They exposed their woeful incapacity to see and understand beyond the needs, wants and fears of a tiny minority. Aside from actual brutality of oppression, this unfitness to govern was the essence of oppression – and it was starkly showcased again for the world to see.

Furthermore, the Nationalist Party woke up to find that, despite harsh controls imposed on society, history was starting to wave goodbye to the mass acquiescence that had prevailed since the banning of organisations. There was a kind of tearing or rupturing, a birthing of something new. The realisation dawned on government that the old ways of working (and of controlling and commanding black people) wasn't working anymore and would have to be replaced by new ways. Of course, while they responded to their own anxiety about their capacities to rule the majority, their response was to consider reforms to apartheid. But the urban black populace became more vocal in demanding fundamental political change.

The realisation dawned on people – and students themselves who were initially surprised at how their local protest escalated to have national and international ramifications – that they had launched a major new response and that the dominant culture of fear in communities had been broken. The kids had defined a new way of engaging with the apartheid government.

But June 16th was also a major turning point for the ANC and other liberation movements. Up to that point, the liberation position was strong, well grounded and well articulated (See Mandela's statement from the dock - I am prepared to die. Rivonia Trial, 20 April 1964), with a sound intellectual and moral basis. However, leading organisations such as the ANC were comprised mainly of the educated and the elite. Where there was grassroots support, it was not really the organisation’s motive force.

June 16th signalled a new dynamism – it triggered a process of rooting the struggle for freedom more deeply in poor communities countrywide. It illustrated the will and capacity of poor and oppressed people to organise themselves.

Of course, such capacity was linked to social changes: by June 16th, urbanisation had become a greater force. Through that process, capitalism and apartheid had grouped poor black people in ghettoes that were ideal for organisation. In this regard, June 16 became our "intifada", operating on a geographical base that was constantly monitored and designed for control, but which as easily became a platform for myriad small militant sorties and constantly shifting centres of action and protest.

This dynamism infused the liberation movements with a new energy. From then on, the freedom struggle was more community based than ever before; and guidance and direction from the leadership was matched with leadership, perspectives and input from below. In time, the student and community-based resurgence linked with workplace organisation. Such organisation had begun on the basis of different disciplines - but solidified when we witnessed the 1973 strikes that sparked a major growth spurt in independent trade unions. It also tapped into the very potent contribution of the Black Consciousness Movement (which operated mainly at higher education institutions and which combined a strident voice, charismatic leadership, innovative intellectual work and projects in poor communities).

The June 16th protests added a new impetus and urgency to the work of the liberation movements. It made these movements much more robust, resilient and rooted; it increased the range of options for actions and resistance on the ground in South Africa. Clearly, the June 16th events (which began as protest but ended as resistance) contributed in fundamental ways to the democracy that we have today, and to the capacity of communities to hold leaders and parties in the new South Africa accountable.

June 16 1976 let a thousand flowers bloom.

In summary, the event and its immediate outcomes denote a watershed in that it:
· Consolidated and extended, to a significant degree, the grassroots foundations of the freedom struggle.
· Infused energy, perspectives, and leadership from the grassroots into the ANC and PAC, and in so doing added immensely to the resilience and strength of these bodies.
· Once and for all, broke the “spell” of fear that had been entrenched through the joint effects of repression and brutality on the one hand, and propaganda, ideological control and suppression of free speech on the other.
· As far as community-level activism went, moved beyond community organisation (as in self-help projects) to community mobilisation for political change.
· Gave concrete effect to the notion of mass struggle, a term often invoked by liberation movements but not yet generally or widely realised in practice.
· Demonstrated the efficacy of combining “leader-led” national protest action and people-led action undertaken at local level and co-ordinated through the efforts of hundreds (and later many thousands) of activists.
· Constitutes a key contribution to the building of democracy.

The challenge of proactively managing the succession process

The second of two blogs on who the next president of the ANC (and, by extension, the next president of South Africa) will be and the related selection process.

The succession debate brings the challenges facing the ruling party to the fore in a pointed way. Will the African National Congress (ANC) proactively adapt, or will it let change be an external force that pummels it into a new and better shape? In the long run, willingly adapting will be less painful and traumatic.

As a liberation movement of long standing, the ANC has ways of operating that are distinct from other organizational formations. These ways were particularly effective given the circumstances in which it had to operate and the job it had to do. It was fit for purpose, so to say. The organization was relatively cohesive (avoiding the major splits that debilitated the PAC and the BCM). It endured the decades in exile. It managed the ceasefire and a tricky, violence-beset negotiations process in a deeply divided country. In the first and subsequent national elections it raked in more than the lion’s share of the votes.

But now old ways of doing things must give way to the new. This is so on a number of levels; and so the organization has had to begin operating in various areas more like a political party. It has had to manage the links, tensions and articulations between the political party’s structures and government. Even though the ANC is in power, the party as a distinct structure generates the political mandate, upholds the manifesto and holds accountable its people in government. It is getting to grips with what it means to keep an evaluative eye on government in the light of your manifesto when you are the party in power – and through its imbizos how to do so effectively by drawing branches, broad membership and grassroots communities into such assessments.

Regarding leadership succession processes, the official ANC view – and stubbornly so – is that the old approach to leadership election served the party well enough. In terms of procedure, there is no “leadership race,” at least not so many months before the electoral-year conference; the contest will only occur at the national conference itself. The established procedure also tells us that no one puts themselves forward as a candidate for ANC president; party members implore you to stand as a candidate. In all of this the candidate remains coy, humble and perhaps feigning a reluctance to stand.

But reality has intruded; and, as usual it is messier than we like to think. Firstly, there are significant shifts in the human factor. Far too many comrades do not place great store on the idea of standing back until you are deployed or until someone divines that you have certain goals and aspirations about leadership combined with the relevant abilities. Such comrades are not shy about wanting to fast track their chances of ascending to their desired leadership role. Indeed, they feel liberated enough to drop clear hints about their outstanding leadership capabilities and how ready they are to serve the party and the country at higher or the highest levels. Their stance is a far cry from the veterans of the struggle – the ones who are remarkable precisely because they generally subjugated personal and family needs to the demands of the struggle and never blew their own trumpets when the filling of elevated positions was at stake. For many, this newer phenomenon – what some have described as careerism linked to the seductiveness of power, status and influence over budgets – goes together with attaining and enjoying freedom and sharing in the fruit of liberation. It is part of the normalization of society.

This personal/human dimension needs to be overlaid with another aspect: the reality of difference and the emergence of distinct interest groups in the ruling party. Fighting a deadly enemy unites people; it is easy to be seamlessly cohesive in relation what you are "against". However, defeating the enemy – and facing the question of what you are “for” – brings many deep and implacable differences to the fore in a very pronounced way. In today’s ANC, for example, there are differences on the role of business in society, on how poverty should be tackled, on whether the power of provinces should be boosted or diluted and on how race should be handled. In this context, one can see how these elements combine: individuals who want to be in the highest posts possible and certain groups that are looking for a powerful or potentially powerful leader to spearhead their agenda.

Within this reality we have the ironic situation where there is - officially - no succession race underway but where groups and individuals are working flat out on campaigns to determine who will (and who will not) be the next ANC president. This messy situation is having a variety of corrosive effects on the ANC and its effective functioning as South Africa’s leading progressive party. Consider these examples, all linked directly or indirectly to succession-related infighting and rivalry:
- The situation is leading to policymaking and leadership paralysis in certain areas. In many provinces, and in a good number of municipalities, projects and policy initiatives have been shot down for the simple reason that they were being proposed by a person viewed as being from a rival camp.
- Mistrust and suspicion is rife. Comrades and colleagues generally seem inordinately anxious to know whether one is positive or negative toward either current ANC President Thabo Mbeki or Jacob Zuma. Many ANC officials working in government - where various interest groups have little knots of supporters - feel it is better (safer, more prudent?) not to express a view on the succession debate.
- The contestation is playing into - and complicating - other social fault lines (race, ethnicity and gender), with deleterious consequences. In the Western Cape, the most powerful ANC leaders of African and coloured origin don’t work together even though such co-operation is the ANC’s only hope for advancing positive social change in that province. In KwaZulu-Natal, we see a rise of small but vocal pockets of activists who espouse Zuluism - the notion that “I am Zulu first, South African later”. With regard to gender, the position is direr. In her book, The Kanga and the Kangeroo Court, Mmatshilo Motsei argues that the complainant in Zuma’s rape trial is a person “caught in the crossfire of the nation’s succession battle”. As the process unfolds, Zuma is under pressure to define his attitude to women’s rights while the ANC Youth League has issued veiled warnings that it will closely watch to see that the ANC’s strong commitment to advancing women into top roles does not play too strong a role in the succession debate. The struggle for women's rights and gender justice is hard enough; but now the real issues of gender, women's rights and women's leadership are becoming entangled in claims of conspiracy and suspicions of a utilitarian approach to gender issues.
- Policy discussions are being downplayed in favour of mudslinging, the digging up of scandals and some dirty play. We have seen basic gender issues mystified, the anti-corruption fight being distorted, masks being worn instead of candid engagement and, of course, the hoax e-mail saga.

It is in the light of this that the movement should consider adopting a different approach. It should accept that a good number of party members might wish to throw their hats into the ring for the presidential race. It should accept that such persons, or at least their supporters, might want to mobilize support for their candidacy.

It should permit free discussion that would include motivating why a particular person would be good for the growth and future of the organization. It should create a climate where such support for a particular candidate is not necessarily viewed as hostile to or a declaration of war on another presidential hopeful.

The ANC should allow a process in which a person may announce themselves as a candidate for the presidential election a good seven or eight months before the actual election takes place. Also, it might consider a process where a leadership discussion and several leadership conferences are held before nominations are opened. Such events could explore the ANC’s present and emerging leadership needs and translate such into key criteria for top leadership. Linked to this, it could require that those submitting a nomination make a formal submission which sets out how a particular candidate being nominated meets the criteria. Branch and regional endorsements can still be part of the process; candidates can be required to obtain such endorsement either before or after such nomination.

Being more open about the existence of succession fever will allow the party to manage the process through the use of ground rules for campaigning. Nominated candidates could be required to sign-off their acceptance of such ground rules. Thus, those who are nominated will be aware that, while they may campaign fervently and even aggressively, they may do so only in ways that are acceptable, ethical and line with certain principles espoused by the movement. Less mud, more substance! And they will know that, sooner or later, their behaviour will be scrutinized and examined by party colleagues, the media and the wider public in the light of agreed rules of play.

Of course, no-one is suggesting that making such changes as discussed will be easy-peasy for the ANC. Apart from anything else, it will involve giving up the noble ideal about the altruism of leaders in its ranks and conceding that, these days, individual commitment is not as pure and simple as it used to be. It will entail admitting that the needs and aspirations of ANC members are shifting and that not everyone accepts that individuals should be totally subsumed within the collective. But the ANC will find that the gains made are worth the pain. For example, an above-board electioneering process managed by an explicit code of conduct for campaigning will reduce or minimize damage to the organisation caused by “underground” fights over who will be party boss. The other benefit would be that discussion over leadership - leadership qualities and capabilities as well as norms of democratic contestation for leadership power – would be deepened.

Tussles for leadership need not be divisive, destructive, toxic, debasing and damaging to a political party’s credibility – succession and changes in top leadership can also be managed in ways that are good for the party and take democracy forward.

ANC succession race is on

The first of two blogs on who the next president of the ANC (and, by extension, the next president of South Africa) will be and the related selection process.

One cannot discuss the big ANC succession debate without getting into the more juicy stuff, including wild and completely subjective speculation about what the odds are, who's stabbing who in the back and what the favourites and outsiders look like.

A major bunfight is underway, with various groups within the ANC wanting to make sure their man or women is in the top job. COSATU and the Communist Party are angling to directly influence who sits there (because they want much greater influence in ANC affairs), while a strong lobby groups has built up around Jacob Zuma. For their part, the powerful and politically skilful President Thabo Mbeki and his staunchest supporters have their own designs on the "who" and "how" of the elections for the top post - and are giving clear signs they won't simply let these other pressure groups have their way.

As far as women candidates go, Foreign Affairs Minister Nkosazana Zuma is very much in the runnings. She is a compelling leader, has in the past been called up to be the country's Deputy President (and said no) and is now one of the most capable and likely compromise candidates for the post of ANC president. She is of course part of Mbeki's Cabinet and undoubtedly has his support. At the same time, former hubby Jacob Zuma - when approached - has apparently told her he would not mobilise his forces to squash her chances if she stood. However, her challenge is that she lacks a strong base among rank and file. Her portfolio has also kept her far from the provincial and branch battlegrounds where such support is won or lost.

Another strong women candidate is Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo-Ncgucka. She is astute, has substantial government experience and a deft handle on policy issues. However, the feeling in movement circles is that she "is not ready". Like pre-cooked food marinating in sauces or like a really good wine, she is being reserved for later.

What women have counting against them is their sex (living in a patriarchal society, should we be surprised at all?) When you ask well-placed movement men about the chances of a particular women becoming ANC numero uno, they simply smile or give a muffled laugh and say: the membership is not ready for a women president. In some cases, what this means is: I myself am not ready, given our culture and values, to embrace such a shift.

As male candidates go, Jacob Zuma is in pole position. Many people suggest Zuma is not ANC leadership and presidency "material". But reality is that Zuma is eminently electable, especially if you consider what has counted for donkey's years: He is tried and tested in terms of struggle, and he is currently the ANC Deputy President. Many detractors wonder if he can handle policy debates and the conceptual issues related to transformation, at least at the same level that President Mbeki - or even Phumzile Ngcuka - does. But these are new criteria, and indications are that such new criteria simply do not wash with rank and file. Others point to Zuma's escapades - with the shower, the condomless-sex and the kanga, and his highly deficient management of his financial affairs - and to related indications that he is unable to practice "leadership of self". But such things are major flaws only in the eyes of the greater public and a minority within the ANC; the bigger chunk of ANC members view these as forgivable errors and/or irrelevant issues. Of course, Zuma's challenge - if he is not stopped by a court case and if he indeed sails through the lobbying and voting - would be how to repackage and market himself so that he can be accepted as a (legitimate and respected) leader of progressive forces and South Africans more broadly.

In the background are names like Reserve Bank Governor Tito Mboweni and Minister of Trade and Industry Mandisi Mpahlwa. This is the pinstriped brigade, the ultra sophisticated men of the movement. Put them in front of an audience of international investors and they have the latter munching out of their hands. They are seen as credible leaders. However, these are not forefront contenders when you consider party dynamics and power relations within the ANC. They surface, however, when compromise candidates are discussed. A challenge in terms of these candidates is that, although we know both are capable of such, they have so far not conveyed any strong "stands" in relation to how transformation should proceed and be accelerated.

The name of Finance Minister Trevor Manual cannot be left out of a discussion on succession, even though he ranks as a complete outsider due to the ANC's traditional emphasis on black African leadership of the struggle. But he scores high on NEC election lists at ANC national conferences, and his name has popped up in the debates leading up to the conference later this year as a possible "one-term" compromise candidate. The disadvantage for him is that COSATU hates his guts for forging and driving forward government's GEAR policy.

What about the chances of business tycoons in the ANC. Many of these have great appeal with the wider public, and would be easily marketable as president to broad interest groups in society. The business bigwigs can mobilise well at certain levels - and Saki Macozama is a behind-the-scenes mover and shaker par excellence; but they are generally removed from the grassroot membership. Parts of the ANC constituency, particulary those which share COSATU and Communist Party membership, will vehemently oppose such candidates on the grounds that such persons would use a presidential position to drive business interests and put the brakes on a working class agenda.

Saki Macozoma is seen to be embroiled in some of the factional divisions in the ANC and would be a definite no-no for the Zuma constituency. He might have to be happy with the role of kingmaker that many ascribe to him. Of the businesspersons, Tokyo Sexwale seems to be the only one with a meaningful chance. His social responsibility initiatives are more widely known than others in his league, and he has certain political skills that, if he were appointed the Big Man, may be handy in managing stalemates and deadlocks between the major opposing camps. Cyril Ramaphosa is the darling of many in the business and media world. However, Ramaphosa's Achilles Heel is that while he is tried and tested as a unionist, he is not steeped in ANC traditions. Furthermore, the challenge for almost all in the businessmen category is that both the Mbeki and Zuma support groups view them with deep distrust and suspicion - as opponents to be stopped rather than horses that could receive possible backing. Also with respect to this group and their relationship to current political leadership in government, there is very frequent talk of backstabbing, recrimination and grudges that date back to previous succession contests.

Finally, while Zuma may have peaked too early, someone coming late into the race is the ANC's Kgalema Motlanthe - a horse that looks sleek, seems race fit and has energy to go the distance. With his hands on the ANC machinery and strong day-to-day connections with the membership base, Motlanthe is an extremely strong contender. He has political flair, and a political style that, although ponderous, is positively regarded by most within the ANC: a patient and considered decision-making style, high regard for process and consultation, a commitment to notions of fair play and a deep knowledge of "the ANC way of doing things" coupled with a habit of constantly drawing on ANC historical knowledge and theoretical foundations. Although there are various rumours about his partisan involvement in the tussling between the Zuma and Mbeki mobilisation groups, his strengths mean that he could survive this controversialness. He balances a strong link to unions and active members in many of the poorest provinces with an attention to old fashoined ANC practices that may still make him acceptable as the leader to the broadest base.